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Michigan v.
Mosley:
Miranda
Safeguards
Eased
Charles J. Iseman

In the recent case of Michigan v.
Mosley, 44 L. W. 4015, the United States
Court held that the procedural requirements established in Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, do not prescribe a second
custodial interrogation of a criminal defendant where: (1) Miranda warnings
are properly given before each custodial
interrogation session, (2) the defendant
exercised his right to remain silent in the
first session and the session was immediately stopped, (3) a significant
amount of time elapsed between the two
sessions, (4) the defendant did not request an attorney"and (5) the crime that
is the subject-matter of the second session differs in nature, time and place of
occurrence from the crime that is the
subject-matter of the initial interrogation
session.
The facts of Mosley are that defendant
Mosley was arrested for robberies, based
upon an anomymous telephone call received by the police, and was then interrogated at the police station by the arresting officer, who gave the defendant the
full Miranda warnings. The defendant
told the officer that he didn't wish to
answer any questions about the robberies and the interrogation was then
promptly terminated. Over two hours
later, a different police officer questioned
the defendant abot a murder and robbery that were notsubjects of the first
interrogation; full Miranda warnings
were again given. This time, in response
to the officer's untruthful statement that
"Smith had confussed to participating in
the slaying and had named [Mosley] as
the shooter." 44 L.w. at 4016, Mosley
implicated himself in the murder. Mosley
was subsequently convicted for firstdegree murder at a trial in which his

motion to suppress his incriminating
statement was denied and in which this
statement was admitted into evidence:
he was then given a mandatory life sentence. The Michigan Court of 'appeals
reversed the judgement of conviction
and held that the second interrogation
was a per se violation of the Miranda
requirement that interrogation cease
upon defendant's exercise of his right to
remain silent, 51 Mich. App. 105 214
N. W. 2d 564. The Michigan Supreme
Court denied further appeal, 392 Mich.
764. The United States Supreme Court
then granted certiorari to consider
whether the second interrogation violated the Miranda procedure that:
" ... If the individual indicates in any
manner, at any time prior to or during
questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this
point he has shown that he intends to
exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege;
any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than
the product of compulsion, subtle or
otherwise. Without the right to cut off
questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to
overcome free choice in producing a
statement after the privilege has been
once invoked. [Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. at 473-474]"
. Justice Stewart's majority opinion
examined the above passage from
Miranda and found that:

" ... To permit the continuation of custodial interrogation after a momentary
cessation would clearly frustrate the
purposes of Miranda by allowing repeated rounds of questioning to undermine the will of the person being questioned. At the other extreme, a blanket
prohibition against the taking of voluntary statements or a permanent immunity from further interrogation, regardless
of the circumstances, would transform
the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity, and deprive suspects
of an opportunity to make informed and
intelligent assessments of their interests.
Clearly, therefore, neither this passage
nor any other passage in the Miranda
opinion can sensibly be read to create a
per se proscription of indefinite duration
upon any further questioning by any
police officer on any subject, once the
person in custody has indicated a desire
to remain silent," 44 L. W. at 4017.
From this examination of Miranda, Justice Stewart concluded that "[t]he critical safeguard identified in the passage at issue is a person's 'right to cut
off questioning' " and that " ... the admissibility of statements obtained after
the person in custody has decided to
remain silent depends under Miranda
on whether his 'right to cut off questioning' was 'scrupulously honored'." 44
L.W. at 4018.
The Court found that the 'scrupu-
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lously honored' test was met, in the instant case, from the facts that the initial
interrogation took only about twenty
minutes, that there was over a two hour
period in between interrogations, that
Miranda warnings were fully given both
times and great care was taken both
times to ensure that Mosley understood
them, and that the two interrogations
concerned different and separate factual
occurrences. Whereas the Michigan
Court of Appeals viewed Mosley's case
as factually similar to Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (a companion
case to Miranda), the United Staes Supreme Court found marked factual
differences in that Westover involved
prolonged, sequential interrogations with
no significant time lapses and without
any warnings to the arrestee. In essence,
the Court found no overreaching by the
state, that Mosley's statement was voluntarily and informedly given, and that the
principles of Miranda were preserved.
For these reasons, the decision of the
Michigan Court of Appeals was reversed
in favor of the state and the case remanded.
Justice White concurred in the result,
but would have gone further than the
Court and would have overruled
Miranda to the extent that the
" .. .Miranda decision might be read to
require interrogation to cease for some
magical and unspecified period of time
following an assertion of the 'right to silence,' and to reject voluntariness as the
standard by which to judge informed
waivers of that right." 44 L. W. at 4020.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice
Marshall, dissented on the ground that
" ... as to statements which are the
product of renewed questioning,
Miranda established a virtually irrebuttable presumption of compulsion ... and that presumption stands
strongest where, as in this case, a suspect, haVing initially determined to remain silent, is subsequently brought to
confess his crime. Only by adequate
procedural safeguards could the presumption be rebutted." 44 L. W. at
4021. Justice Brennan would find two
altemative adequate safeguards to be a
speedy arraignment or presence of
counsel. He said:
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"I do not mean to imply that counsel
may be forced on a suspect who does
not request an attorney. I suggest only
that either arraignment or counsel must
be provided before resumption of questioning to eliminate the coercive atmosphere of in-custody interrogation. The
Court itself apparently proscribes resuming questioning until counsel is present if
an accused has exercised the right to
have an attorney present at questioning." 44 L.W. at 4021, n.4.
The dissent also feels that the subjectmatter of the two interrogations were related because the informer's tip for the
arrest covered both sets of crimes, the
homicide arose from the factual context
of a robbery, and defendant had told the
initial interrogator that he didn't want to
say "[a]nything about robberies," 44
L. W. at 4022. That is, the dissent believes the right to remain silent was
exercised in a manner to cover the
subject-matter of the second interrogation.
In evaluating the Mosley case, it appears to me that the subject-matter test is
a non sequitur; i.e., that Mosley stands
for the proposition that repeated interrogations are proper if (I) Miranda warnings are given before each interrogation
session, (2) there are Significant time
lapes between sessions, (3) each session
ceases when the defendant exercises his
Fifth Amendment rights, and (4) the factual case-by-case context does not show
relentless badgering of a suspect in such
a manner as to coerce his testimory or
undermine the voluntariness factor essential to an informed and willful statement. As a practical matter, strong limits
remain upon the ability of the state to repeatedly custodially interrogate suspects. These limits include the suspect's
rights to continually exercise his right to
remain silent, his right to obtain the assistance of counsel at any stage of interrogation, and his right to a speedy hearing
before a magistrate. Further, excessive
pressure from the state will still result in
the inadmissibility of inciminating
statements. The net effect of Mosley still
leaves the public interests in police investigative work in balance with the constitutional rights of public defendants.

Federal Court
Intervention and
Local Police
Departments
by Lindsay Schlottman

In an action brought under 42 U.s.c.
sec. 1983, the Supreme Court, led by
Justice Rehnquist, reversed a federal district court's attempt to end a pattern of illegal and unconstitutional police mistreatment of citizens. Rizzo v. Goode, 44
LW 4095, was decided on January 21;
1976 and is the resting spot for litigation
which lasted six years.
Rizzo began as two separate actions
(Goode v. Rizzo and COPPAR v. Tate),
each commencing in 1970, in which the
principal defendants were the officials
occupying the offices of Mayor, City
Managing Director (who supervises and,
with the Mayor's approval, appoints the
Police Commissioner) and Police
Commissioner (who has direct supervisory power over the police department).
The two suits, permitted to proceed as
class actions, alleged a pervasive pattern
of illegal and unconstitutional police mistreatment, of minority citizens particularly, and of Philadelphia residents generally. The defendants were charged
with conduct ranging from express authorization or encouragement of police
misconduct to failure to act in a manner
which would assure that such misconduct would not occur in the future.
Before the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, forty-odd
incidents of alleged police misconduct
were revealed. Hearings lasted twentyone days and two hundred and fifty witnesses testified, resulting in findings of
fact which both sides accepted with respect to thirty-six incidents. {The inci-

